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11: The Finite-Infinite Relation
A Conversation with Simon O’Sullivan
In this conversation, Simon O’Sullivan explores the aesthet-
ic (as opposed to epistemic) ‘catastrophe’ touched on in the 
introduction via a longstanding philosophical tradition that 
he unites under the title ‘production of subjectivity’ which 
resists the strong Kantian separation of phenomena and 
noumena, positing instead a continuum between the finite 
and the infinite. Kant may have kept the noumenon at arm’s 
length from reason, but O’Sullivan explores the other phil-
osophical resources that have been utilized to access it, and 
in doing so questions the very idea of neatly definable limits 
to philosophical enquiry.   
Simon O’Sullivan is a theorist and artist working at the 
intersection of contemporary art practice, performance, 
and continental philosophy. He is currently professor of art 
theory and practice at Goldsmiths, University of London, 
specializing in the work of Gilles Deleuze and any philos-
opher willing to push subjectivity to its limits. He is author 
of, amongst others, On the Production of Subjectivity: Five 
Diagrams of the Finite-Infinite Relation and co-editor of the 
forthcoming Futures and Fictions. 
---
You wrote a book called On the Production of Subjectiv-
ity. I was hoping you could give an outline of what you 
mean by the production of subjectivity. 
The phrase itself comes from Félix Guattari, a psychoan-
alyst and writer who collaborated extensively with Gilles 
Deleuze. For him the ‘production of subjectivity’ concerns, 
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in part at least, the question of how we live our lives and, 
indeed, produce who and what we are. This was part of his 
larger interest in ‘ethico-aesthetics’, which is best under-
stood as a kind of paradigm outside the more scientific and 
narrowly technological one, and related to this practice of 
self-creation. In my book, I took the framework that Guat-
tari offers and developed it alongside some of the late writ-
ings of Michel Foucault on technologies of the self, as well 
as other thinkers who I felt fitted within this paradigm, very 
broadly speaking. The book, then, is really to do with how 
we might produce ourselves differently or, you might say, 
how we can move from subjection – or being subject-to – 
to what Deleuze and Guattari would call subjectivation. For 
me this is all intimately related to the ways in which capi-
talism, for want of a better word, goes ‘all the way down’. It 
struck me that the terrain, if you like, of any struggle against 
dominating forces wasn’t just out there, it was in here too; 
in our bodies, forming and shaping our desires, our values, 
and so on. So the book was an attempt to draw together a 
whole archive of theoretical resources that I thought might 
be useful for excavating/inventing another way of being. I 
was keen not to be partisan, and not necessarily to follow 
already existing camps, but to try out some creative cou-
plings, force some encounters between these different re-
sources and then diagram some of the compatibilities and 
syntheses. I mean diagramming quite concretely; there are 
quite a few of my own diagrams in the book (alongside those 
from other thinkers) that themselves arose from drawings 
done in a pedagogical setting.
So all the philosophers I do engage with in the book, wheth-
er it’s Spinoza, Nietzsche, Bergson, Foucault, or Deleuze 
are, I think, attending to concrete problems related to the 
subject or subjectivity. Deleuze and Guattari especial-
ly seemed to offer up a kind of philosophy that was about 
life – a pragmatics of sorts for actually living life otherwise. 
These philosophers are also involved in thinking about time 
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and temporality, and I became interested in the question of 
how to get out of time, if I can put it like that, how to live 
against a certain standardised, homogenised experience of 
time. There is a sense in which each of these figures I just 
mentioned had found a way of exploring or experimenting 
with temporality, or, at least, re-conceptualising it. I figured 
this, very broadly, as a kind of ‘accessing’ of the infinite, 
for example via the gap between stimulus and response in 
Bergson, Spinoza’s progression through the three forms of 
knowledge, or the eternal return in Nietzsche. It was as if 
each of these thinkers had a secret, something important to 
say about all this, and what I wanted to do was bring some 
of these insights together, try and produce something com-
posite – a composite diagram – between them all.
You mention Foucault. A lot of people find his shift from 
questions of power and its relation to knowledge to his 
later writings on technologies of the self to be a bit bi-
zarre, like a kind of dandyism or even narcissism dis-
connected from anything beyond the self. Could you say 
a bit about this trajectory in his thought?
For me, one of the interesting things about Foucault was the 
way in which in his later writing he attended to a particular 
relation to force, and, indeed, the possibility of a kind of 
‘folding-in’ of external forces – a folding-in of the outside. 
He felt that despite the problems we faced in being subject 
to the forces of neo-liberalism there were ways of producing 
a certain space of freedom by making autonomous decisions 
about how one lives one’s life. As you say, this was the sub-
stance of Foucault’s interest in the Ancients and their var-
ious ‘spiritual exercises’, but also Baudelaire and dandyism 
– the whole ‘life as a work of art’ attitude and orientation. 
But, again, in interview especially, Foucault also related this 
to our own contemporary moment and the impasses we are 
in, politically speaking. I found this incredibly powerful, 
and, in fact, was also drawn to Jacques Lacan’s work in this 
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area – despite the more obvious differences from Foucault 
– about the goal of psychoanalysis being about becoming a 
cause of yourself (you find this in his seminar on The Ethics 
of Psychoanalysis). It seemed to me that this was also a cru-
cial factor in Spinoza’s Ethics in which he describes a kind 
of retroactive claiming of those forces that had caused you. 
To bring this down to earth a little, these were all questions 
that, I felt, were also related to my own life as it was then. 
I had basically reached a sort of impasse myself and so this 
question of freedom was very much a lived problem for me. 
So it wasn’t abstract or, at least, not abstract in one sense 
anyway – it was about how to start producing my life differ-
ently, or what is my own production of subjectivity.
Your book is built around what you term the finite-in-
finite relation. This suggests that it could be read as a 
response to Kant’s famous barrier separating the finite 
from the infinite or the phenomenal from the noume-
nal. Is there a sense in which you were reacting against 
this barrier? 
I think that’s right. The gambit of the book, at least in one 
sense, was to look at what you call the barrier or the curtain 
between phenomena and noumena, and then look at ways 
to rethink this relationship. It’s a philosophical investiga-
tion into this other tradition that resists the strong Kantian 
separation of phenomena and noumena, and that instead 
posits a continuum between the finite and the infinite. This 
relates to what I just said about temporality, but also to the 
production of subjectivity insofar as the typical subject only 
comes into being because it raises these shutters against the 
infinite (or, indeed, is defined by these shutters). I was inter-
ested in another model where these shutters were less fixed, 
where we might ‘open up’ further to the world or universe. 
We could take as an example of this kind of framework 
Deleuze’s famous description of the tick: its world is com-
posed of three coordination points – heat, light, and smell. 
213Simon O’Sullivan
So in the vast universe the tick only has these three coordi-
nation points related to its survival needs. The tick’s world 
is, as it were, subtracted from this vastness. But thinking 
about this in relation to us, as we are, these coordination 
points are mutable. Our capacities for being affected, and to 
affect, can be increased to the point where we further and 
further approximate the infinite. This more or less Spino-
zist/Bergsonian idea was particularly attractive to me and 
became one of the key bases for the book, alongside the 
more explicitly Guattarian angle. 
At one point in the book you write that you were seeking 
a non-theological approach to what you term ‘the prob-
lem of finitude’. Could you say a bit about what you mean 
by finitude here as it can be used in quite a few different 
ways? 
Yes, I use finitude in different ways, but, generally, I was 
concerned with finite existence, and also the alienated sub-
ject split off from the world. So the way in which I work 
with this problem is, I think, different from the way certain 
other contemporary thinkers (associated with Speculative 
Realism) are currently working with it. I’ll give a couple of 
examples. So the ‘new’ Promethean philosophers like Ray 
Brassier and (though less so) Reza Negarestani would see 
finitude as an accident of sorts that can be overcome by a 
kind of project of remaking ourselves (utilising technology 
for example). Basically they refuse a sanctity of the given over 
the made, which would be at least one definition of religion, 
and, in its place, accentuate and affirm the human capacity 
for invention and construction. Another prominent thinker 
who is addressing this problem is Quentin Meillassoux, but 
for him the way beyond finitude lies in mathematics and the 
possibility of thinking the absolute in a manner that breaks 
with the finitude of the subject. So both the Promethean 
philosophers and Meillassoux think that a particular kind 
of abstract intelligence is the way to overcome the problem 
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of finitude, whereas my starting point in the book was that 
we always already are in the great outdoors, part of the in-
finite; and yet for some reason we don’t quite see that, for 
some reason our consciousness occludes that. So there is a 
sense in which what I call the ‘subject-as-is’, in other words 
the subject that is basically an accumulation of habit (and 
reactivity), is condemned to finitude, and the challenge is 
to find a way round this for the subject, the possibility of a 
subject-to-come, as it were.
In your book you use a lot of terms like pre-human, 
post-human, trans-human, in-human, a-personal, 
non-corporeal to describe this subject-to-come. What 
do you mean by these kinds of terms?
In general the human is a particular configuration or itself 
a diagram of a mode of being, a habitual way of being in 
the world, and I am interested in what other diagrams or 
configurations there might be. This goes beyond the philos-
ophers I write about to other thinkers and practices that I 
also look to. At the moment I’m working on a book on fic-
tion and what I call ‘fictioning’ which is partly about these 
other models for other ways of life (especially as they are 
incarnated and embodied in different art practices and per-
formance). But there are others. Take Buddhism for exam-
ple. One of the key fetters in Buddhism is the habitual fixed 
sense of self that operates as an anchoring fiction. But this 
fiction can be loosened and one can begin to see the edges 
of the self, and then explore certain terrains beyond the self, 
and, with that, other patterns of being. This idea that there 
might be another way of being outside the subject-as-is has 
also been explored to a certain extent in neuroscientific 
accounts of the illusion of the self, for example in Thomas 
Metzinger’s work on the ego tunnel and Ray Brassier’s work 
on what he calls the ‘nemocentric’ subject. So although the 
terms you list have specific functions in my book, they are 
all pointing to the question of whether there’s another way 
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of being beyond the typical, the habitual, the normal – ba-
sically beyond the finite which is constraining and produces 
so many problems. 
Where does philosophy itself fit into all of this? Once 
you’re in the realm of Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge 
or Bergson’s intuition, there’s a sense in which we have 
gone beyond concepts and the limits of what we typical-
ly call philosophy. 
There’s no clear-cut answer to a question like that for me; 
certainly it would seem, ultimately, that concepts give way 
to something else in the two cases you mention. But I am 
also a Deleuzian, and go along with his definition of philos-
ophy as a form of concept creation. So for Deleuze concept 
creation is not to be understood as simply approximating 
more and more of the real but is rather experimental and 
inventive; a kind of construction of the real as it were. It’s 
an undertaking that results in more and more expansive 
ways of being in the world. This is not to say that there is no 
limit to conceptual thought; this is where affect, intuition, 
and other kinds of practices come in. Concepts can cer-
tainly build platforms and be incredibly creative, but at the 
same time any philosophy that emphasises only concepts, 
just like any philosophy that emphasises only discourse, ne-
glects vast panoramas of experience. So one of the central 
ideas of the book is that as subjects or as thinking bodies 
we’re far more complex than conceptual thought. To para-
phrase Deleuze’s book on Spinoza, the body surpasses the 
knowledge we have of it and thought surpasses our con-
sciousness of it. Nietzsche says something similar with his 
idea that consciousness is like this little figure riding on this 
massive unconscious knowledge which isn’t some sort of 
mysterious Freudian thing below the bar, but is simply what 
else is going on (in the body) that your consciousness thinks 
it knows but which actually outstrips this knowledge. This 
is where you get the Spinozist injunction that we don’t even 
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know what a body is, we don’t know what thought is. This is 
really what Spinoza means by ethics. It’s not about morality, 
about right and wrong or good and bad, but, rather, con-
cerns the question: what am I capable of becoming? 
There is a sense in which joy in Spinoza is a kind of ‘in-
human’ affect that lies right at the heart of his ethical 
project. Joy or affirmation is a central topic in your book 
so I was hoping you could say something about this. 
For Spinoza, joy is not a kind of ego-state like happiness, or 
not only this anyway. Rather it is a kind of ethico-ontological 
principle through which one can increase one’s knowledge, 
when this is both conceptual and bodily. In other words one 
can only acquire knowledge through agreement, through 
certain things coming together and agreeing. These joyful 
encounters increase my capacity to act and, with that, also 
produce a certain kind of knowledge. This can’t be separat-
ed from Spinoza’s monistic ontology insofar as joy arises 
from agreement and an overcoming of separation. You may 
find dualists disagreeing with him on this, but this isn’t just 
about what philosophical coat you happen to be wearing; 
rather you can test it in your experience. Does joy come 
from these productive encounters? Does it take you some-
where? This idea also has a place in Nietzsche and his idea 
of the eternal return, this sudden inhuman affirmation that 
takes us beyond ourselves, beyond nihilism and into a sense 
of cosmic communion, albeit one that ‘we’ don’t experience. 
Thinkers like Spinoza and Deleuze bring the body back in, 
bring affect back in, bring the passions back in, focusing on 
these kind of bodily forms of intelligence, whereas philos-
ophy per se is quite often seen as involving an intelligence 
contra the body. Anyone who has ever engaged in any kind 
of work on themselves understands this: that the intelli-
gence that does all the reasoning is a very small part of the 
process. Having said that, there is no point in pitting affect, 
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the body, the libidinal and so on against reason or concepts. 
In Spinoza, for example, we find concepts (understanding 
what things have in common) built off the back of affects 
which in turn produce affects, and so on. It’s a circular rela-
tionship, or perhaps that should be spiral as this knowledge 
certainly develops incrementally. 
We’ve discussed Kant’s dualism of phenomena and nou-
mena, and ways to break down or overcome this dual-
ism. But it’s very difficult to let go of the idea of the nou-
menon or the transcendent as something separate from 
the world around us. Could you say something about 
how we can move beyond this longstanding philosophi-
cal split between two worlds? 
 
One of the things that attracted me to Deleuze was his re-
configuration of these splits like transcendent-immanent, 
noumenon-phenomenon, finite-infinite, and so on through 
his distinction between the actual and the virtual. So the 
idea – very simply and reductively – is that we are sur-
rounded by virtualities only some of which we actualise due 
to our perceptual mechanisms and habits, but crucially this 
virtual realm is not some other transcendent place, it’s here 
all around us. As Deleuze might put it, the virtual is ‘fold-
ed’ into the actual and vice versa. So the actual-virtual dis-
tinction does not relate to other worlds or insurmountable 
barriers but to differences in perspective (when this is very 
broadly construed). So these aren’t really dualisms at all. 
The tendency to split one world off from another, whether 
it’s this world versus the world of pure forms or the next life 
or whatever it may be, is, for me, religious thinking, and this 
is what thinkers like Deleuze are challenging. This is what 
immanence means to me. So these thinkers, philosophers 
of immanence we might call them, are all suggesting that 
the potential for life comes from where we are now, and this 
was a very exciting thought for me. 
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You mentioned earlier that questions of temporality 
were closely linked to questions of subjectivity, and to 
overcoming the finitude of the subject. In your book you 
mention Nietzsche praising the creativity of idleness 
and Walter Benjamin extolling the virtues of boredom, 
and obviously boredom was a mood that Heidegger 
wrote about as having huge transformative potential. 
But these kinds of contemplative states seem opposed 
to the more political goals of resistance that motivated 
you in writing your book. Have I made a false dichotomy 
here? 
In Two Sources of Religion and Morality, Bergson writes 
about the Christian mystic, and what he says is that the 
Christian mystic goes off into his mystical states, breaks 
habits, experiences cosmic memory and all the rest of it, 
but then returns to the world and is active within it, and 
that it is in fact this superabundant activity that characteris-
es them. I think this is important: introspection and action 
in the world are not, it seems to me, incompatible. Far from 
it. I also think contemplation or introspective technologies 
can be a strategic retreat, but one that involves a confron-
tation with one’s own habitual reactive mechanisms, so it’s 
like retreating to a laboratory to work out what that reality 
really is. To come back to Foucault, there is the sense in 
which insight or knowledge gained through technologies of 
the self reveal the world to you very intimately insofar as its 
desires and values are incarnated in your body and mind. 
This knowledge can give you a greater freedom to act in the 
world precisely through being able to resist it more effec-
tively. So being able to resist certain stimuli that ask you to 
be productive on one level (I’m thinking of TV, 9-5 living, 
careers, and the rest of it) allows you to access much richer 
depths of productivity and creativity. 
My own experience is, and in this sense I agree with Berg-
son’s point about the mystic, that people who are involved 
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seriously with inquiry into the self and introspective tech-
nologies tend to be the ones who are most active. So I don’t 
really go along with the idea of contemplation as a retreat 
in the sense of a disengagement from the world. As far as 
boredom goes, I was interested in the idea that slowing 
down or ‘stopping the world’ allows other things to come 
to the fore – and with that the possibility of another mode 
of being. I should also say that this was what I found es-
pecially inspiring in Deleuze and Guattari’s books: they of-
fered a whole selection of different modes of organization, 
alongside a different account of how subjectivity was actu-
ally produced (as itself a kind of side effect of what they call 
‘desiring production’).
So where do you feel that something like production of 
subjectivity is actually being practised?
If the production of subjectivity is used as a banner to talk 
about people who are really working on themselves, trying 
to work on their habits, trying to explore other modes of 
being, all these kinds of things, then it would be fair to say 
that it’s not necessarily happening in religion, it’s not nec-
essarily happening in academia, it’s not really happening in 
the art world. When I was writing that book it was only in 
certain forms of western Buddhism that I found it (I first 
read Pierre Hadot’s Philosophy as a Way of Life – another 
important inspiration for my book – in a reading group on 
a Buddhist retreat), but there are always certain kinds of art 
scenes, and certain sub-cultural scenes where something 
like this is going on, to say nothing of political groups and 
activist collectives. So it’s always going on but you don’t find 
it necessarily in professional or academic philosophy de-
partments. I think this partly has to do with what Foucault 
identified as the Cartesian moment and the paradigm of 
knowledge and thinking in the West that defers to science 
and objectivity, so spirituality (which is a term Foucault ac-
tually uses in his later work) or other forms of introspective 
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or ethico-aesthetic knowledge come to be seen as a bit soft 
or wishy-washy. But of course it’s not. To take meditation 
as the most obvious example, it’s not about drifting off; it’s 
hard, in fact, it can be very hard. It’s also very precise, like a 
science – or technology anyway. 
To return to the question of finitude, there is a strong 
sense in which the finite-infinite relation touches upon 
questions of death or mortality. People say that death is 
something of a taboo subject, that it’s not something we 
really talk about, so do you have anything to say about 
its place in modern society?
While Kantian finitude is primarily related to the limits of 
our knowledge, I was interested in something more basic 
about our existential situation. Looking back on the book 
from where I am now I think it’s pretty obvious that I was 
attempting to address the issue of death, or at least this was 
part of my motivation, albeit not entirely conscious at the 
time. Put bluntly, was there a way around this brute fact of 
our existence? I think Spinoza himself said something sim-
ilar about his motivation for writing the Ethics – that he 
wanted to see if he could find something in life that was 
eternal. I’ve mentioned Buddhism a couple of times and 
this was also, of course, a key motivation for the Buddha-
to-be, whose path to enlightenment was set in motion by 
his realisation about old age, sickness, and death. In fact, 
for me, there’s something profoundly similar about these 
two – Spinoza and the Buddha – almost as if they arrive at 
the same place but via different directions. 
More generally I would agree with what you said: death is 
the one thing that’s certain, it surrounds us, but no one talks 
about it. Looking around you, you’d think no one was go-
ing to die, but it’s the horizon of everything. For me there’s 
something important about facing that reality and seeing 
what follows from it. This relates to what we discussed ear-
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lier about philosophy often being in the head, being about 
concepts, being about discourse, as this can, of course, 
be just another way – albeit a very sophisticated one – of 
avoiding all that kind of stuff. But it’s also true that think-
ers like Spinoza really do open up a different take on the 
problem of our finitude, they offer a different ethics for life 
which is also a kind of experimentation with life. In particu-
lar with Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge there’s a sense 
in which the boundaries between self and world dissolve, 
or, rather, as if we identify with the world rather than our 
limited sense of self (and thus our finitude). It’s in this sense 
also that Spinoza suggests a kind of eternity that can be 
experienced within finitude – not immortality, as Spinoza 
wasn’t interested in life after death, but a certain sense of 
the eternal that is here and now, but needs to be actualised.
